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In t~e

Supre~ne

Court

of the State of Utah
IX . THE JI...\ TTER OF THE
APPLICATION OF JEROLD
E. THO~IPSON, to change the
point of diversion and place of
use of 4.0 c.f.s. acquired by Application No. 16833; Change Application No. a-2017.
JOHN C.

~IcGARRY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

CAsE No. 2528.

JEROLD E. THOl\fPSON and ED. _
H. WATSON, State Engineer of
the State of Utah,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
PRELI~IINARY

STATEMENT

The facts in this case are substantially as stated in the
appellants' brief. However, we feel that the statement
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of some additional facts will afford the Court a more comprehensive picture of the pleadings and issues upon which
the case was tried and the facts upon which the trial
Court decided this cause.
Following are the facts in sequence of time:
On July 21st, 1945, one M. C. Hintz en entered into
an agreement with John C. McGarry, plaintiff and respondent, to purchase the south 100 acres of the southeast
quarter of Section 8, Township 35 South of Range 16
West, Salt Lake Meridian (Plaintiff's Ex. 1).
On August 17th, 1945, Hintzen made application to
appropriate 4.0 c.f.s. of water from a well to be located on
the ground being purchased from McGarry for the purpose of irrigating said land (Plaintiff's Ex. 5).
On February 26th·, 1946, Hintzen assigned this application to McGarry by written assignment, the consideration for such written assign:q1ent being a transaction
whereunder Hintzen returned 80 of the 100 acres being
purchased from McGarry and receiving from McGarry in
lieu thereof another 80-acre tract ~it]:l an approved water
application (Reporter's Tr. 5).
Later, on April 6th, 1946, Hintzen gave Thompson a
written assignment of the identical application theretofore assigned McGarry. The consideration for this assignment was the doing of some work by Thompson on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the Hintzen grountl-not on the ground turned back to
l\IcGarry but on the ne"" 80-acre tract acquired by Hintzen
from McGarry. It is stated in appellants' brief· on page 5
that Hintzen remained on the property described in the
sales contract until }fay or June of 1946 and that Thompson entered into his agreement with Hintzen to take the
water .assignment, and did the work on Hintzen's ground,
during the first part of April, 1946. Such statement is
incorrect. Thompson claims to have commenced work on
Aprillst and to have completed it on the 15th and 16th of
the same month (Rep. Tr. 11). Hintzen had already given
lip possession and moved off the eighty acres exchanged
to McGarry, and was residing on th~ new tract when
Thompson took the assignment and did the work for
Hintzen (Rep. Tr. 34-35-36).
On the 9th day of August, 1946, Thompson filed in the
office of the state engineer a change application by which
be proposed to change the point of divers~on of waters
from the point set forth in the Hintzen application to a
new well site and to change the place of use of the entire
4.0 c.f.s. of water.
Thereafter and within the time allow.ed by law McGarry filed his protest to the granting and approval of
the change application, and on March 3rd, 1947, the state
engineer, Without a formal, or any hearing, approved the
change application. (Alleged in complaint and admitted
in ans\\rers).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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That on or before the 31st of 11arch, 1947, an appeal
'vas duly taken from the decision of the state engineer,
and the appellants were both personally served with summons and notice of appeal.
On May 7th, 1947, several months after the protest
to the change application was filed, and several weeks
after the appeal was taken from the state engineer's
decision, Thompson commenced 'vork on the well at the
ne'v location and under the change application (Rep. Tr.
15 and 17).
The issues upon which this case was tried, presented
to the trial court; submitted, argued and determined, are
as follows:
The complaint pleads that !fcGarry became the sole
o'vner of the original Hintzen application by virtue of
his assignment dated Feb. 26, 1946; that Thompson claims
to have an assignment of the same 'vater application acquired from Hintzen on April 6th, 1946; that the Thompson assignment had no legal effect or value because when
given to Thompson the said Hintzen had nothing to convey
and retained no right in or title to such application, and
consequently Th~mpson acquired no right, title or interest in the application. The only issue raised by the complaint was the matter of priority of the two assignments
(Tr. t" to 5).
.
The answer of Thompson squarely meets that issue
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by claiming he purchased the assignment for a valuable

consideration, made in good faith and "rithout notice; that
at the time of such purchase there 'vas no record in the
office of the state engineer or in the office of the County
Recorder of Iron County, Utah, indicating that McGarry
claimed any interest in the application, and Thompson
counterclaims by alleging practically the same facts and
asking that he be adjudged the o'vner of the application
(Tr. 20 to 23).
The anS\\er of the state engineer by way of defense
pleads the priority of the Thompson assignment for the
sole and only reason that it 'vas presented to his office for
recording about April 16th, 1946, and that the 1IcGarry
assignment was filed in his office about December 20th,
1946. The state engineer also pleads in the affirmative
defense that he was informed and believes that at the
time Thompson accepted the assignment from Hintzen he!
the said Thompson, had no kno\vledge of the existence
of any prior assignment by Hintzen to John McGarry and
that Thompson paid value for such assignment and received it 'vithout notice of any outstanding claims, and
for value (Tr. 10 to 15).
The state engineer and Thompson, by their pleadings,
defended solely on the proposition of priorities. Even a
cursory examination of the pleadings and the proceedings
at the trial will conclusively sho'v that the case was not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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only pleaded, but was tried and argued and submitted to
the trial court on but two propositions, to-wit:
First, did the McGarry prior assignment, as a matter of law, take precedence over the subsequent Thompson
assignment, although the Thompson assignment was filed
for reco~d in the office of the state engineer prior to the
JVIcGarry assignment; and.,
Second, the factual situation as to whether or not
Thompson was a purchaser in good faith, and without
notice.
The trial court held for the respondent, McGarry, on
each of those two propositions. If this Honorable Court
sustains the trial court on either of those propositions,
the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.
In view of the ,position no'v taken by both appellants
-and for the first time on this appeal-we urge this
Court to bear in mind the issues raised by the pleadings,
and being the issues upon which the case was tried, argued,
submitted, and determined by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
We shall :p.ow address ourselves to the first proposition argued by the appellants, wherein it is contended
that an unapproved application to appropriate water is
not assignable.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The proposition adYanced by the appellants is fallacious and should- not no"T be considered for the many
f ollo,ving reasons :
1. It is raised for the first time on this appeal. It.
"1'as neither pleaded, tried, argued, submitted or determined by the trial court on that issue, nor 'vas the trial
court given an opportunity to pass upon that contention.
It is elementary that a case will not be reYiewed on a
theory different than that upon which it 'vas tried and
determined by the trial court.
Furthermore, if the appellants intended to rely on
the defense that the Hintzen application was unapproved
and therefore not assignable, J\ticGarry should have b~en
given an opportunity to meet that~ issue at the trial. The
appellants state that the Hintzen application was not approved, but the record does not so show.
In the early case of Aaron vs. Holmes, 99 Pac. 450,
35 Utah 49, it was said:

"It is also a 'vell settled rule that a theory, assumed and acted upon by the parties litigant in the
trial court, must be adhered to upon appeal. One of
the most important results of the rule that questions
which are not raised in the court below cannot be reviewed in the appellate court is that a party cannot,
when a cause is brought up for appellate review, assume an attitude inconsistent with that taken by him
at the trial, and that such party is restricted to the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

theory of the cause of action.''
''Suit to quiet title to water arising from spring
on plaintiff's land having been tried on theory that
water was originally public water subject to appropriation, Supreme Court cannot dispose of cause on a
different theory.'' Holman, et al. vs. Christensen, 27 4
Pac. 457, 73 Utah 389.
2. If the application from Hintzen to McGarry, even
assuming it was unapproved, was therefore not assignable, ho'v does Thompson gain his rights thereunderf Can
Thompson acquire more rights under an assignment than
can McGarry~
It is argued by appellants that McGarry could acquire
no rights under an unapproved application, yet -Thompson, according to appellants, could acquire rights under
the identical application, and the state engineer can approve a change application based on such identical application and can give Thompson permission to drill a well
under the change application filed thereafter and thereunder. According to appellants' argument and contention, an assignment is good as to one person but not as
to another; the application of Hintzen is sufficient for the
purpose of assigning to Thompson-but not for the purpose
of assigning to McGarry.
This Court must assume the approval of the Hintzen
application from the very fact that he disallowed the MeGarry protest and approved Thompson's change applicaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

tion and granted him permission to drill a well, all with··
out any hearing 'vhateY(\r and most perfunctorily.
3. The state engineer never considered the provisions of Section 100-3-8, lT.C.A. 1943, when holding the
Thompson application took precedence over the ~{cGarry
application, nor are the provisions of that section applicable, either under the issue~ or other"rise. We fail to see
ho". that section has any application.
Neither appellant pleaded that the state engineer had
concluded there was no unappropriated water availabl<~
on the Hintzen property, that the Hintzen land was unfit
for irrigation, that Hintzen or McGarry had no financial
ability to complete the proposed well, or even that McGarry had secured the assignment for purely speculative
purposes. The appellants could have pleaded such facts
and raised that issue, but did not do so.
l\Ioreover, we call attention that the respondent alleged and the appellants admitted that the state eng·ineer
allo\ved the change application and disallowed the nlcGnrry protest 'vithout a formal or any heartng.
The conclusion is inescapable that when the state
engineer disallowed l\IcGarry's protest and approved
'fhompson's change application without any hearing· it
was solely on the basis of Section 100-3-18, U.C.A., 194:1,
interpreting it to mean that as a matter of law ThompSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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son had a lega1 priority because Thompson had- filed his
assignm_ent before-~ l\{cGarry filed his, and even then .the
~tate engineer disregarded }vfcGarry 's right to prov~
Thon1pson "'as not a purchaser for value without notice.
r.rhe fact is that the disallo,vance of the ~.fcGarry prote~t

and the approval of the change application 'vithout a hearing 'vas rather capricious and arbitrary. ij:o,vever, we
'vould be loathe to believe that the state engineer would,
'vithout giving !{cGarry an opportunity to be heard or
to kno'v from what sources he gained the information,
find that :ivlcGarry did not have the financial ability to
complete the well, that his acquisition of the assignment
of the application was not in good faith but for speculation or monopoly (he already owned the land upon which
the 'vell "'as to be drilled) or that any of the reasons set
forth in said Section 100-3-18 were persuasive to his ruling. We are more loathe to believe that if such reasons
existed and such facts believed to be true, the state engineer would 'vithhold them from the trial court and not
even plead or attempt to prove them. But-the state engineer does not say such facts and reasons exist; he pnly
says ''it may be'' so.
He fails to take any position whatever; he does not
say any such facts or reasons exist, but wants this court
to determine this case for the reason that "it may be" so.
fie does not even say any investigation was made or that
he had the slightest inkling as to any of the facts.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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4. _.A.n application to appropriate "\Yater, at least
until it is disapproYed, and 'vhile it is pending in the office
of the state engineer 'vithout either approval or disapproval, is a Yaluable property right and is more than "a
mere possibility or expectancy not co~tpled with an interest."
There can be no question but 'vhat an application to
appropriate water, 'vhen filed in the office of the state
engineer, is a valuable property right. Section 100-3-18
which provides that ''rights claimed under applications
for the appropriation of water may be transferred or
assigned by instruments in writing'' makes no distinction
between approved and unapproved applications. It has
never been contended before, to our knowledge, that an
application to appropriate water may not be assignea
until after its approve!. The state engineer will make no
such contention because he has accepted and recognized
assignments of applications prior to approval upon innumerable occasions. To so hold would be to be read into
the statute something which is not there.
'In the case of Whitmore vs. Murray City, 154 Pac.
(2nd) 748, (107 Utah 445), at page 751, it is said:
''Property rights in water consist not alone in the
amount of the- appropriation, but also in the priority
of the appropriation. It often happens that the chief
value of an appropriation consists in its priority over
other appropriations from the same natural stream.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Hence to deprive a person of his priority is to deprive him of a most valuable property right.''
The ·case of Duchesne County vs. -Hm:Uphreys, 148
Pac. (2nd) 338, 106 Utah 332, discusses an application to
appropriate unappropriated water as a ''right.'' It is
said : ''The first step in acquiring such a right is the filing of an application with the state engineer. The filing
of the application does not give the applicant a vested
right * * * it merely gives a right to complete the appropriation and put the water to a beneficial use in compliance of the act.' ' And certainly this Court, in speaking of
the first step in acquiring a ''right'' by the filing of an
application_ with the state engineer, had in mind the fact
that the application could not be approved until after it
was made and filed.
''The first step toward making an appropriation
* * * may be protected through a suit to quiet title.''
Mohave River Irr. Dist. vs. Superior Court, 256 Pac.
469 at page 472 (Cal).
"One may protect his 'incipient right' to water
against hostile invasions and claims of others. And
the same doctrine is announced in the later case of
Merritt vs. City of Los Angeles, 120 ,Pac. 1064. So
here the plaintiffs may safeguard their rights, although water has as yet been brought into close proximity to their lands." Byington vs. Sacramento Valley West Side Canal Co., 148 Pac. 791 at page 794
(Cal).
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To the same effect are the cases:
Inyo Consolidated ''rater Co. vs. Jess, et al., 119
Pac. 934.
~Ierritt Ys.

City of Los Angeles, 120 Pac.

1064~

II.
Addressing ourselves to the second proposition adYanced by appellants to the effect that Thompson was a
bona fide purchaser for value of the Hi:ritzen application,
we assert that the court found, as a factual matter, that
Thompson was not a purchaser in good faith and without
notice, and that such finding is amply supported by the
evidence.
On cross-examination Thompson testified substantially to the following:
He came into the country (Iron County) in November,
1945; that he intended to engage in farming in that vicinity (Tr. 24); that he and a ~fr. Frailey purchased 960
acres of ground and 'vas advised and assured by McGarry
that one well of 4.0 second feet 'vould be sufficient to
irrigate 160 acres and that he and Frailey applied for
wells of 4.0 second feet each to irrigate each 160 acres.
When Hintzen 'vas discussing with Thompson the deal
whereby the application would be assigned, Thompson
kne'\\T that Hintzen had turned back to McGarry 80 of the
100 acres acquired from 1\'IcGarry and which land was to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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be irrigated from the Hintzen \Veil. On 11arch 19th, 1946,
Thompson \Vas in. the office of the state engineer making
inquiry in regards to transferring well permits and
\Vhether he could get permission so to do. He examined
the book of \Vell permits and checked wells that had not
been drilled. (Having made this check he kne,v, of course,
that the I-Iintzen \Vell had been applied for to irrigate the
100 acres which Hintzen had purchased from McGarry
and described as being in the SEl/4 of Sec. 8, Tp. 35 S. ,R.
16 \\T ., S.L.:1I.). He returned from Salt Lake and on the
following day he had a conversation with McGarry at
Cedar City. He made no mention to :1IcGarry of his proposed deal \Yi th Hintz en although he had previously gotten
the name of Hintzen, as having a \Yell right, from the records of the state engineer. He made no inquiry from
l\fcGarry as to \vhether 1\fcGarry had taken back the water
rights ''~th the land, although he knew :1IcGarry, and had
done business "Ti th him and could easily have discussed the
mattflr. I-Iintzen had giYen up possession of the acreage
\vhich he turned back to l\1cGarry, had moved his house
from the McGarry tract to a new tract \vhich had a water
right attached thereto, all of which was known to Thompson. The work 'vhich Thompson claims to have done was
on the new tract and no \vork was done by Hintzen on
the 1\IcGarry tract. Thompson knew the Hintzen application was for 4.0 second feet to irrigate 100 acres but testified he kne'v nothing about the duty of water and had no
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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idea that 4.0 second fet't 'Yonld be more than sufficient to
irrigate the t'Yenty aeres "chich IIintzen had not turned
back to ~IcGarry. Thompson testifeid also that he knew
nothing about the dl1ty of 'va ter and "rhether the duty of
"Tater \Yas 4.0 second feet for 160 acres or for 40 acres.
He testified also that he neYer questioned Hintzen as to
'vhether Hintzen had turned the application back to McGarry with the land and never questioned the ownership
of the well permit, because he never 'vent into anyone's
personal business, ( R.ep. Tr. 22-23).
McGarry testified (Rep. Tr. 37-38) in the fall of 1945,
months before Thompson made his deal with Hintzen and
prior to the purchase of land by Thompson and Frailey
there were discussions about the. duty of water and
Thompson was advised one second foot ·\vas sufficient to
irrigate 40 acres and that a \Vell right for 4.0 second feet
would i1~rigate 160 acres ; that Thompson made application to the state engineer for well permits to irrigate the
960 acres and made his application on the basis of 4.0 second feet for each 160 acres. The trial court evidently did not giVe credence to
Thompson's testimony concerning his total and supreme
ignorance about water rights and the duty of water and
his reasons for not making further inquiry.
Were all of the foregoing facts sufficient to put
Thompson on notice that Hintzen might have disposed of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the water to

~lcGarry

when turning back the land for

which the \Vater had been applied, and thus put Thompson on inquiry 1 The trial court believed that when the
land was turned back to ~fcGarry and Thompson was so
advised by Hintzen before the assignment was given to
Thompson, and when Thompson kne'v that the Hintzen
application was made to irrigate the premises \vhich had
been turned back, and 'vhen he knew that even though
Hintzen retained 20 of the 100 acres he could not retain
and hope to secure a certificate of appropriation of 4.0
second feet to irrigate 20 acres of land, it was sufficient
to put Thompson on notice and inquiry. After all,
Thompson kne\v McGarry-kne\V \vhere }.fcGarry was loeated and could be contacted; he had had dealings and
conversations with McGarry and could easily have ascertained the true situation by a simple inquiry from MeGarry-particularly after kno"ring that Hintzen had acquired from McGarry a nev{ tract of land with an attached
and appurtenant water right in exchange for the old tract
for \vhich water had been applied. Thompson was a
farmer and realized the value of water to land and knew
that land in the vicinity in question could not be of much
Yalue "rithout water. Thompson undoubtedly from his
discussions with McGarry, his application to the state engineer for \veil rights on the 960 acres being· purchased,
and his visit to the office of the state engineer, kne"'' or
suspected, or should have kno'\\rn and suspected that the"
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liintzen land would not be turned back 'vithout the well
permit for tl1e irrig-ation thereof, and he could have ascertained the fact by a simple inquiry. Vl e cannot see ho'v
the trial court could have done other"'ise than find that
Thompson was not a purchaser in good faith and without
notice.
The broad rule is laid do"'"ll in the late case of
:Jieagher Ys. Dean, et al., 91 Pac. (2nd) 454, 97 Utah 173,
as follows:
"\.Vhate:ver is notice enough to excite attention
and put the purchaser on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry
might have led.''
See 0 'Reilly vs. McLean, et al., 37 Pac. (2nd) 770, 84
Utah 551, ''herein it is held ''where purchaser had such
information as will put ordinarily prudent person on inquiry, purchaser must make such inquiry and is charged
with notice which could have been obtained from such inquiry."
''One who has constructive notice of an outstanding title or right is not a bona fide purchaser. It has
been held that constructive_ notice rests upon strictly
legal presumptions 'vhich are not allowed to be controverted, while implied notice arises from an inference of facts and is a form of actual notice. Regardless, however, of the technical distinction made by
some courts between constructive notice and implied
actual notice, it is a general rule that knowledge of
such facts as ought to put a prudent man on inquiry
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as to the title charges a subsequent purchaser with
notice, not only of those facts -which are actually
known, but also of all the other facts which a reasonably diligent investigation would have ascertained,
provided the inquiry becomes a duty and would lead
to the knowledge of the requisite facts by the evercise of ordinary diligence and understanding. * * * *
In applying the rule each case must be governed by
its own peculiar circumstances." 66 C.J. page 1111.
''A purchaser who is put on inquiry does- not
discharge his duty by making inquiry of his vendor
alone but must exhaust all reasonable and available
sources of information and hence the fact that the
purchaser is misled by the vendor's false statements
is not sufficient to protect him.'' 66 C.J. page 1115.
''If purehasers of realty from corporation hold-ing record title 'vere put on notice regarding corporation's actual status as second mortgagee and did not
make reasonable inquiry, purchasers were charged
with knowledge of all facts that they might have
learned had such diligence been exercised, as regards
mortgagor's interest in such realty." Murray vs.
Wiley, 127 Pac. (2nd} 112. (Wyo).
The question as to whether Thompson 'vas an InnoC(1llt purchaser for value 'vithout notice, was one of fact
for the trial court.
"Where it does not appear by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the trial judge was wrong
in his findings of fact, they must stand." Hoggan vs.
Price River Irr. Co., 216 Pac. 237, 61 Utah 547, citing
numerous Utah cases.
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To the same eff eet see :
•) . . 1
..J' .

Froyd Ys. Barnhurst, 28 Pac. (2nd) 135, 83 Utah

l\lollerup Ys. Dayncs-Bebee 1\{usic Co., 24 Pac.
(2nd) 306, 8~ Utah 299.
\\. . e are inclined to the vie"'" that the instant case is
a law and not an equity case, and, of course, in such event
the rule is that if there is any evidence to support the
court's findings, such findings may not be disturbed by
the appellate court. But, even though it is determined
that this is an equity· case we are convinced beyond question that there is ample evidence to support the trial
court's findings and it not appearing by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the trial judge was wrong in
his findings, they must stand.
''Obviously, the question as to whether defendant
'vas an innocent purchaser for value without notice
,,~as, under the issues, one of fact for the trial court.
If there is any substantial evidence which would support the trial court's findings that defendant was not
an innocent purchaser for value and without notice,
the judgment would have to be sustained.'' Davis vs.
Kleindienst, 169 Pac. (2nd) 78, at page 81.
Moreover, in the above cause of Davis vs. Kleindienst, supra, it is held that:
The controversial question in the case was
whether defendant was an innocent purchaser for
value and without notice. This question is to be de-
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termined under the ordinary rule, by a preponderance
of the testimony. 66 C. J. 1201, Sec. 1065, Vendor and
Purchaser. The evidence as to this need not be
clear convincing and satisfactory. If, therefore,
therd is any reasonable evidence to justify the court
in finding that the defendant purchased without notice, or was not a purchaser for value, then the judgment should be sustained.''

In order to have some basis upon which to insist that
1\1cGarry is estopped from setting up his interest, appellant Thompson makes numerous statements in his brief
that cannot be sustained by any proof whatever, either
actually or by inference. \V e call attention to statements
on pages 20, 26 and 27 of appellants' brief, wherein it is
said that ~IcGarry participated in and approved ''the
plan'' for Hintzen to make application in his own name,
notwithstanding the land stood in the name of McGarry;
that McGarry took part in having the application placed
in Hintzen's name for the purpose of holding out to the
world that Hintzen was the owner; that McGarry was instrumental in having the water right application placed
and permitted to stand in the name of Hintzen, etc. We
presume the basis for these statements is the clause in
the sales contract between McGarry and Hintzen as follo,vs:
"It is agreed that in the event the buyer or any
assignee or assignees shall make application to appropriate water or shall procure a certificate of apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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propriation to appropriate water from wells located
upon said premises and said buyer or assignee or
assignees shall thereafter default in this contract
the seller shall immediately become the assignee of
any such application or applications and the state
engineer of the State of Utah is hereby authorized to
recognize said seller as the assignee of any such application and in the event a certificate of appropriation
has issued to the buyer the water rights thereunder
shall be considered as appurtenant to the said premises and in the event of default the title thereto shall
immediately pass to the seller.''
The appellants no\\r seek to bolster their position by
innuendoes entirely "'ithout justification. Respondent
submits that the real estate contract was usual, and similar agreements executed constantly; and that under such
agreement the buyer, Hintzen, and not the seller, ~IcGar··
ry, would make application to appropriate water, if he
wanted water. Furthermore, there is nothing in the contract that required Hintzen to make application to appropriate water. The fact is that the contract was made
on July 21st, 1945, and Hintzen did not make application
until the 17th of August, 1945, about a month later. There
is no proof that McGarry advised or insisted that Hintzen
make such application or was at all interested in the application. A clause in a sales contract, providing that in the
event improvements be made on premises under purchase
and in the event the contract goes into default, such improvements remain as a part of the realty, is indeed very
common, particularly when applied to improvements
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about which there might later be some contention as to
appurtenancy. We are at a loss to know why, under the
circumstances, anyone but Hintzen, who was buying the
land, 'vould make the application, or why, having been
made in the name of Hintzen, the transaction becomes
suspect. This situation is not analogous to one where an
owner of premises holds out to the world that he· is not
such owner and has no interest therein, and thereby misleads a third party to his injury. How can Thompson be
heard to say that he was misled and McGarry was estopped from claiming an interest in the application, when
the record shows that T~ompson himself purchased land
from lVIcGarry and made application in his own name for
appropriations of water. Had the matter of estoppel
been pleaded, McGarry could easily have met· that issue
by showing that Frailey and Thompson purchased 960
acres of land under an almost identical contract with the
same provisions written therein.
We are quite in accord with the statement of appellant
that if the facts pleaded constitute an estoppel, it is sufficient; but fail to see how any facts pleaded either by
Thompson or the state engineer constitute an estoppel or
were even intended so to do. Certainly the cases cited by
appellant to sustain such_ a proposition have no application to the instant cause. The only facts pleaded as a defense are those claiming that ThoJI!pson was a purchaser
in good faith and without notice and that his filin()'
of the
0
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Hintzen assignment in the offiee of the state engineer
prior to the filing of .JieGarry 's assignment gave him a
first priority and a go0d title.
"The la"~ is 'veil settled that the facts relied upon
as constituting an estoppel must be pleaded." Barber
YS. Anderson, 27 4 Pac. 136, 73 Utah 357.
'• In an action under Comp. Laws 1907, Sec. 1206, for
goods furnished defendant's 'vife, plaintiff cannot recoYer on the ground that though the family relation
had ceased to exist at the time of the sale, the defendant 'vas estopped by his conduct to deny liability,
"-here such estoppel was not pleaded.'' Berow vs.
Shields, 159 Pac. 538, 48 Utah 270.
In Utah Pacific Digest, ,.,.ol. 15, under Estoppel, Sec.
110, are found innumerable cases from all jurisdictions
in the west to the effect that an estoppel must be pleaded
to be available and that the facts relied on as showing estoppel must be pleaded. It is true, of course, that in a
suit to quiet title, where the plaintiff does not set forth
or plead in his complaint the precise claim of title which
will be relied on, nor the muniments establishing the
title, then facts establishing an estoppel may be proved
under the general issue; but it is idle for appellant to
argue here that McGarry did not set out the source of his
title. He specifically pleaded Hintzen 's application, and
his subsequent succession thereto by assignment. He
specifically set out Thompson's claim of the title and the
source thereof, to-wit, the assignment of the Hintzen apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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plication at a later date to Thompson, Thompson's change
application and the state engineer's wrongful approval
thereof. Thompson filed an answer raising certain issues,
none of which pleaded estoppel or were intended so to do.
The estoppel theory is one evolved long after the trial and
submission of the issues to the trial court.

vV e

agree that the application here involved is of
great value because the Governor of Utah has issued a
public proclamation pursuant to Sec. 100-8-1, U.C.A. 1943,
declaring that ·no more water may be appropriated in the
area where Hintzen filed his application to appropriate
water. But it has as great a value to McGarry as it does
to Thompson. Neither may now secure water from the
underground source through filing an application to appropriate water. If it be argued that Thompson had expended moneys in drilling a well under his change application it should be remembered that the well was drilled
not only after McGarry protested the change application
but after this action was com1nenced to question the ruling of the state engineer in allowing such change application.
III.
·The state engineer's chief reliance for the correctness of his position and the construction of Section 100-S:
18, U.C.A. 1943, which he contends for, ~ies in the ruling
of the Utah Supreme Court
the case of Wells Far0'·0
'

in

'

'
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& Co.

Smith, et al., 2 Utah 39, and affirmed by the
l~. S. Supreme Court in the case of Neslin vs. Wells,
104 u. s. 428.
YS.

We cannot agree that the statute under construction
by the Utah Supreme Court and the U. S. Supreme Court
is a direct parallel to Section 100-3-18. There are numerous differences as to facts, circumstances and status of
statutes. The statutes in effect in 1870 were applicable
"'"hen the facts in the above case arose. The only provisions applicable, aside from creating the office of County
Recorder, were the provisions that the recorders should
provide themselves with good and well bound books suitable for the purpose and record therein all transfers or
conveyances of land or tenements and all other instruments of writing and documents suitable, necessary and
proper to be recorded, and that the books should be indexed in alphabetical order and free. to examination of
all persons, and upon filing of any paper for record the
recorder should endorse upon the back thereof the time of
receiving it. The statute became effective March 2nd,
1850. The case was never over-ruled expressly, nor could
there be any occasion to do so because the case was decided
on a statute in effect in 1873 when the Wells Fargo case
facts arose, and in 1874 the recording statutes were
amended expressly to provide that a failure to record
would make a conveyance void as· against a subsequent
-purchaser without notice. However, the case was decided
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on a two to one opinio~, and the statements and rule of
la'v set forth in the dissenting opinion have since been
re-stated and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court as well
as every other western jurisdiction when the matter of a
recording statute has been in question. The Wells Fargo
case has never been cited, so far as we can determine, in
any subsequent case, and under recording statutes similar
to ours, as authority for the position now taken by the appellants in this cause.
The statute in question, Sec. 100-3-18, provides that
''From the time of filing of same'' it imparts notice to
all persons of the contents thereof. (In his brief the state
engineer in commenting on this statute makes no mention
of the words "from the time of filing the same"). It
fails to provide ,as does the statute concerning the recordation of water deeds anq the recordation of other instruments ''and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and
lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take with
notice thereof.'' It simply affirms that from the time of
filing, notice is imparted to persons of the contents of the
assignment. It was enacted at the same time as Section
100-1-10. Both Section 100~3-18 and 100-1-10 (the water
deed statute) were a part of the 1919 Act found in Session Laws of 1919. Section 78-3-2 and 78-3-3 were in
effect when the legislature provided for the filing of assignments of rights claimed under applications for ap:..
propriations of water in the office of the state engineer,
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so the legislature kne,Y, or 've must presum.e it kne,v, that
concerning- recording of documents in the office of the
county recorder there "'"as a statute providing for a penalty for failure to record; and it kne,v, or we must presume
it kne"""' that concerning 'Yater deeds being recorded (Sec.
100-1-10) there '"'"as a provision not only that from the
time of filing- the same 'Yith the recorder notice 'vas given
to all persons of the contents thereof, but also a provision
''and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take with notice
thereof.''
Sec. 100-5-12 is the section requiring the filing of
notice of underground claims with the state engineer. It
is significant that this section also provides ''failure to
file notice of claim or claims, as provided in this section,
shall be prima facie evidence of intent to abandon such
claimed right and in the distribution of the underground
water of this state the state engineer may disregard any
claim not so filed. ' ' The legislature expressly provided
the penalty for failure to record und~rground claims but
provided no penalty whatever for failure to record assignments of applications. It contented itself with stating that
''from the time of filing the assignment notice would be
imparted of the contents of the assignment.''
When the Wells-Fargo case was decided, it was decided entirely on the basis "it was a common thing, one
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of public notoriety, to record mortgages and other conveyances, and that fact that there were offices in each
county for the purpose of making such recordations was
also a matter of public notoriety." But there is no assurance that. the Territorial Court of Utah would have construed Sec. 100-3-18 as the state engineer would have this
Court construe it, in the face of the language contained in
Sections 100-1-10, 100-5-12, 78-3-2 and 78-3-3, had such sec.
tions or statutes existed at that time. Moreover, it is significant that immediately following the decision in the
Wells-Fargo case and in the. face of the favorable holding,
the legislature in 1874 amended its first recording statutes
and provided expressly for the penalty when the instrument was not recorded.

By the overwhelming weight of authority in more
recent cases than the Wells-Fargo case, our Supreme
Court and other jurisdictions have held that recording
statutes are not enlarged by implication. See Doris Trust
Co. vs. Quermbach, 133 Pac. (2nd) 1003, at page 1006, 103
Utah 120; wherein it is stated: ''Constructive notice from
a record is wholly a creature of statute. No record will
operate to give constructive notice unless such effect is
given such record· by statute.''
"It is to be noted that constructive notice by record or registration was unknown to the common law.
Such notice is a matter of statutory origin and in the
absence of statutory provision the record of a chattel
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mortg·ag·e would not constitute notice for any purpose
\V.hen the terms of the statute are compiled with the
record becomes conclusi Ye notice, often contrary to
the fact. \r e cannot read into the statutes the harsh
rule of constructive notice in the absence of legislati\e expression.'' Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings .6.-\.ssn. Ys. X a tiona I Funding Corp., 114 Pac. (2nd)
49.

''The recording of an instrument is constructive
notice to those who acquire interests subsequent to
execution of instrument or 'vho, in dealing with property are compelled to search the records in order to
protect their own interests, but it does not affect the
rights of prior parties.'' Ryan vs. Plath, 140 Pac.
(2nd) 968.
"Common-la". . rule that grantee -was not obligated to record deed has been changed in California,
but extent of change is expressed in statute." Noble
vs. Blanchard, 8 Pac. (2nd) 523.
Section 100-3-18 expressly provides that notice of the
contents of the assignment filed in the office of the state
engineer imparts notice to all persons of the contents
thereof ''from the time of filing. '' When there is no
penalty provided for failure to record or file a prior assignment, the notice is not imparted to a prior assignee,
hnt notice is imparted onlv from the time of filing or to
a subsequent assign~e. This proposition has been well
settled in the cases of Askerson vs. Elliott, 165 Pac. 899 ;
and Ryan vs. Plath, 140 Pac. (2nd) 968, and other ca~es
therein cited.
''Furthermore, the deed to that company did not
constitute constructive notice to appellant, since she
"\Yas not a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer.
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The recording of an instrument pursuant to a recording statute such as Rem-Rev. State Sec. 10596, is constructive notice to those persons only who acquire
interests subsequent to the execution of the instrument, or who, in deali..ng with property, are compelled
to search the public records in order to protect their
own· interests ; it does not affect the right,s of prior
·parties.'' Ryan VR. Plath, 140 Pac. (2nd) .968, citing
45 Am. Jur. 470, Records and Recording Laws, Sec.
89.

Are the concluding words in Section 100-1-10 concerning deeds of a water right-'' and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien-holders shall be deemed to
purchase and take with notice thereof''-of any meaning
whatsoever? Or are such words mere surplusage~ Such
'vords appear in the general recording statutes. But no
euch words appear in Sec. 100-3-18. If the contention of
the appellants. is correct, then the above 'vords in the general recording statutes and in Sec. 100-·.1-10 are surplusage
and have no meaning at all. They would not be necessary
to shut out the right of one- failing to record.
Thompson admits freely that before he took the Hintzen assignment he was advised by Hintzen !hat 80 acres
of the land for whieh water was applied had been turned
back to ~fcGarry. I..~ikewi.se, Thompson admitted freely
that Hintzen was out of possession of the McGarry ground
and had turned_ the possession back to McGarry. Under
these circumstances we believe the rule announced in
Neponset Land and Livestock Co. vs. Dixon, 37 Pac. 573,
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10 lJ tah 334, -and follo,ved by a long· line of decisions in
Utah, should apply. The rule there announced is ''The
failure of a grantee "~ho is in possession of the land to
record his deed does not render it void as to subsequent
purchasers, as possession is notice to all the world of the
holder's rig·hts. ''
The state engineer asserts that he is alarmed over
the holding that some third party may hold title to an
unapproved application without ever recording that assignment with the state engineer, because a duty has been
imposed upon him by Section 100-3-8, which section has
to do with the approval or disapproval of an application.
And would his alarm be overcome if the assignment is
made after the approval of the application, and the assignment is not recorded for some time after~
Section 100-3-18 provides for filing of assignments
in the office of the state engineer covering ''rights
claimed unedr application~'' and makes no distinction
between approved and unapproved applications. The legislature did not see fit to require that an assignment be
filed in the office of the state engineer, or provide for
any time within which it must be so filed. It did not make
void an assignment that was not filed in the office of the
state engineer. It did not give the state engineer any
power or authority to reject an approved application because the assignee happened to be engaged in the real
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estate business. It did not prohibit the assignment of an
application to a person engaged in the real estate business .. The legislature did not give to the state engineer
any discretionary power to refuse recognition of an assi~ment or to refuse to permit the assignee to proceed
with the drilling of a well, or irrigation of land thereafter .. If the state engineer is so concerned about the provisions of Sec. 100-3-8, he should know that he is required
either to approve or reject the application. He is not
given any right or authority to say to the original applicant, ''I will reject the application if you assign it to Mr.
McGarry, but I will approve it if you assign it to Mr.
Thompson.''
We say flatly that the state engineer misstates the
facts about his ot~er apprehensions-his right to investigate various matters, and the fact that he approved the
application only after it was shown that a different tract
of land would be irrigated. He asserts in his brief (Pages
41-42) that it is "unlikely" he would approve an application to irrigate the lands covered by the original application; that the court records show the application was not
approved until March, 1947, as shown by Exhibit "0'';
that it was approved after the apparent record owner had
filed a change application showing an intention to irrigate a different tract of land. He asserts also (Page 44
of brief) that "by so considering Thompson to be the
owner the state engineer approved an application which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

33

might never haYe been approYed had it remained on the
old land and in the nan1e of ~IcGarry. ''
The state enginer 's entire course of action belies his
contentions. He does not say that he made any investiga-_
tion; much less does he mention the results of any investigation, nor why he did not hold a hearing, nor plead
and attempt to prove any facts at the trial to show why
he would not approve an application for a well on lands
covered by the original application. He does not say nor
attempt to indicate the basic differences between the land
co,ered by the original application ~nd that covered by the
change application, much less plead or attempt to prove
any such facts at the triaL He wants this appellate court
to deprive !IcGarry of his property rights by supposition,
inuendo and possibility, 'vithout even saying it is a probability, or certainty. What mig·ht appear to be true is the
statement made in his brief that he might never have approved the application if it had been in the name of McGarry, but for reasons undisclosed and based on facts
remaining a secret.

'Ve further ~call attention that Thompson's testimony
is to the effect that the state engineer (Rep. Tr. 32-33)
sends an applicant a copper bank with an identifying number which is to be put on the well after it is drilled and
that the state engineer sends instructions with each of
these bands. He also testified that when he made the
deal '\vith Hintzen and received the assignment (Rep. Tr.
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23), Hintzen stated a copper band had previously been
sent him by the state engineer and he sent it back. The
sending of the copper band assuredly indicates that the
state engineer had granted pern:tission to drill a well on
the ground in which Hintzen 'vas then interested, and that
the Hintzen application was approved. or intended to be
approved. This effectually disposes of the contention
that the application might not have been granted excepting for land covered by the change application. Can this
Court believe, or up~old the doctrine, that the state engineer may give permission to _drill a well at great expense
before determining that the land is fit for irrigation, and
afterwards take the position that he had not made an inYestigation and that the land was unfit for irrigation~
Can this Court believe that the state engineer sent .the
copper band without having approved or intending to approve the Hintzen application~ We think not.
CONCLUSION
The trial court determined this cause in favor of the
respondent on two grounds: First, that the failure of re•
spondent to file his assignment in the office of the state
engineer prior to the time when Thompson filed an assignment did not give to ThQmpson a better title to the application nor did it invalidate the prior acquired title thereto by McGarry. Secondly, that the defendant Thompson
was not a purchaser in good faith and without notice.
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If the trial court ",.as correct in its determination on
either of these theories and grounds, then the judgment
must be affirmed.
''If the trial court was correct as to either of
t",.o g-rounds for its decision, the judgment must be
affirmed." Raymond Ys. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 191
Pac. (2nd) 137, - Utah -.
We submit, therefore, that the judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINE, wILSON Al!D CLINE,

Attorneys for Respondent.
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